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UPDATING THE LIABILITY REGIME IN OUTER SPACE:
WHY SPACEFARING COMPANIES SHOULD BE
INTERNATIONALLY LIABLE FOR THEIR SPACE OBJECTS
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INTRODUCTION
Nothing inspires the human imagination quite like outer space.
How many people have laid on their backs on a dark, clear night
and gazed up at the stars above? The vast expanse of outer space
seems endless. But satellite operators are increasingly realizing
that space is not endless. Indeed, space is becoming more crowded
with space objects, and the threat of these objects causing damage
is rapidly growing. The space industry has changed dramatically in
recent years, and the threats facing the industry have concurrently
evolved.
The world is experiencing the dawn of a new space race—only this
time, private entities are leading the charge rather than govern-
ment agencies.1 Companies like SpaceX and Virgin Galactic are
revolutionizing human operations in outer space by developing
groundbreaking new space technologies and by crafting ambitious
plans for the future of human activity in space.2 The private sector’s
ability to harness market forces has decisively decreased the costs
of operating in space, which in turn has made outer space more
accessible to private entities across the globe.3 As a result, the
number of space objects in orbit will continue to skyrocket in the
coming years as more private actors expand their operations in
1. See Carson W. Bennett, Note, Houston, We Have an Arbitration: International
Arbitration’s Role in Resolving Commercial Aerospace Disputes, 19 PEPP.DISP.RESOL.L.J.61,
63 (2019) (“Space, once the exclusive domain of nationalized space programs, is now becoming
a crowded marketplace with ambitious businessmen seeking to change the world (and turn
a profit).”); Trevor Kehrer, Comment, Closing the Liability Loophole: The Liability Convention
and the Future of Conflict in Space, 20 CHI. J. INT’L L. 178, 189 (2019) (“[C]ommercialization
of space is now nigh-universal.”); Timothy Justin Trapp, Note, Taking up Space by Any Other
Means: Coming to Terms with the Nonappropriation Article of the Outer Space Treaty, 2013
U. ILL. L. REV. 1681, 1685 (2013) (“Instead of having a state-run space program, we are
moving into a space age decided by the private sector.”).
2. See, e.g., About SpaceX, SPACEX, https://www.spacex.com/about [https://perma.cc/
C54E-KCAQ]; Purpose: Why We Go, VIRGIN GALACTIC, https://www.virgingalactic.com/
purpose/ [https://perma.cc/9U8D-PMXS].
3. See Trapp, supra note 1, at 1685 (noting that private companies can “match the
advances of NASA in a fraction of the time”).
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space.4 The probability of space objects causing damage, therefore,
is only increasing.5
Yet, the law governing international liability for damage caused
by space objects has remained shockingly stagnant. The process by
which spacefaring parties are held liable under international space
law has remained the same since the current liability regime was
adopted in the Convention on International Liability for Damage
Caused by Space Objects (Liability Convention) in 1972.6 The
Liability Convention was drafted at a time when only two nation-
states—the United States and the Soviet Union—had space-launch
capabilities.7 Furthermore, the drafters “were neither expected nor
... required to [deal] with” private space actors at the time.8 As such,
the Liability Convention establishes a notably state-centric
framework to assign liability for damage involving space objects, in
which national governments are held internationally liable for
damage caused by any spacefaring actor from that country.9
Given the rapid privatization of the space industry, this Note
argues that the international community should update the
Liability Convention to reflect the modern reality that the private
sector has taken the lead from the public sector in space activity.
The Liability Convention is insufficient and ineffective as applied to
companies, and an international liability regime that directly
addresses private entities will promote certainty, investment, and
development in the space industry for the benefit of all.
4. See Andrew Lavender, How Many Satellites Orbiting the Earth in 2019?, PIXALYTICS
(Jan. 16, 2019), https://www.pixalytics.com/satellites-orbiting-earth-2019/ [https://perma.cc/
JS8K-KQGL]; see also Kehrer, supra note 1, at 189.
5. See Dan St. John, Note, The Trouble with Westphalia in Space: The State-Centric
Liability Regime, 40 DENV. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 686, 688 (2012).
6. Caley Albert, Liability in International Law and the Ramifications on Commercial
Space Launches and Space Tourism, 36 LOY. L.A. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 233, 244 (2014)
(“Since these agreements were completed between 1967 and 1984, they are outdated when it
comes to dealing with commercial launch companies.”); Stephanie D. Veech, Note, To Infinity
and Beyond?: The History of Space Travel and the Legal Implications of Privatized Space
Flight Through the Lens of SpaceX, 18 LOY. MAR. L.J. 151, 162-63 (2019) (“[F]ew additions
have been made to space law since our first launches into the final frontier.”).
7. Yun Zhao, Space Commercialization and the Development of Space Law, OXFORD
RSCH. ENCYCLOPEDIA (July 2018), https://oxfordre.com/planetaryscience/view/10.1093/acre
fore/9780190647926.001.0001/acrefore-9780190647926-e-42 [https://perma.cc/RH8M-JY2J].
8. Frans G. Von der Dunk, Billion-Dollar Questions? Legal Aspects of Commercial Space
Activities, 23 UNIF. L. REV. 418, 423 (2018).
9. Albert, supra note 6, at 245-46.
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Part I of this Note explores the current status of the space
industry and further examines the rise of spacefaring companies.
Part II reviews the treaty framework that establishes the current
rules governing international liability for damage caused by space
objects. Given this treaty framework, Part III assesses the weak-
nesses of this approach. First, gaps in the Liability Convention
create uncertainty as to which State should be held liable in some
cases involving spacefaring companies. Second, the treaty frame-
work promotes the existence of flag states by encouraging national
legislation to account for the incompleteness of the international
treaties. Flag states foster a dangerous environment for the space
industry. Third, the Liability Convention fails to establish effective
enforcement mechanisms. The Convention lacks teeth as applied to
companies, which renders it largely ineffective in certain instances.
As such, Part IV articulates this Note’s two-part conclusion: the
international community should (1) amend the Liability Convention
and (2) assign liability for space object damage directly on space-
faring companies. This amendment would solve each problem
described in Part III and would address the modern realities of
today’s space industry. Indeed, these spacefaring companies no
longer require insulation from liability by their national govern-
ments. Rather, these companies have attracted enormous invest-
ment in recent years and have enough resources in their corporate
treasuries to cover their own liabilities. Moreover, a clearer liability
regime would promote efficiency and certainty for spacefaring
companies, which would benefit their business operations. Conse-
quently, this Note argues that the international community should
modernize the Liability Convention by amending it to place liability
for space object damage directly on the companies involved.
I. THE RISE OF SPACEFARING COMPANIES
Since the early days of space exploration, nation-states have
controlled the trajectory of the space industry.10 The Soviet Union’s
launch of the satellite named Sputnik on October 4, 1957, marked
the first successful launch of an object into space.11 Sputnik
10. Id. at 238.
11. Veech, supra note 6, at 152.
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represented a striking achievement for the Soviet Union’s scientific
community during the Cold War, and the United States rushed to
respond in kind.12 The U.S. Department of Defense immediately
approved funding for a new satellite program,13 and Congress
established the National Aeronautics and Space Administration
(NASA) to promote space exploration “for the benefit of all man-
kind.”14 The space race was a critical front in the Cold War as the
United States and Soviet Union invested enormous amounts of
money and resources into developing their national space capabili-
ties.15
Some private actors began to invest in the space industry in the
early 1980s.16 In 1980, European investors founded Arianespace,
which represented the first commercial space launch service in the
world.17 Strategically located near the equator in French Guiana,
Arianespace’s spaceport launched its first commercial payload in
1984.18 In the United States, Space Services successfully launched
the world’s first privately funded mission into space in 1982 from
America’s first licensed commercial spaceport in Texas.19 Building
on these historic developments, spacefaring companies increasingly
grew in influence and investment over the following decades.20
Today, the space industry is largely characterized by companies
jockeying for dominance in outer space—in many ways, reminiscent
of the space race between the United States and the Soviet Union
during the Cold War era. For example, one modern competitor, Elon
12. Id. at 152-53; see also Sputnik and the Dawn of the Space Age, NASA (Oct. 10, 2007),
https://history.nasa.gov/sputnik/ [https://perma.cc/826B-EZMS] [hereinafter Sputnik].
13. See Sputnik, supra note 12.
14. National Aeronautics and Space Act of 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-568, § 102(a), 72 Stat. 426,
426.
15. Albert, supra note 6, at 236; Sputnik, supra note 12.
16. Albert, supra note 6, at 238.
17. Id.; Milestones, ARIANESPACE, https://www.arianespace.com/company-milestones/
[https://perma.cc/8Z5U-VYL9].
18. Albert, supra note 6, at 238.
19. Heritage, SPACE SERVS., https://www.spaceservicesinc.com/company-heritage [https://
perma.cc/9NZW-YKX5].
20. Paul Stephen Dempsey, National Laws Governing Commercial Space Activities:
Legislation, Regulation, & Enforcement, 36 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 1, 3 (“Private-sector
commercial space activity is growing at a brisk pace, while governmental activity is
declining.”); Zhao, supra note 7 (“The last two decades have witnessed the rapid and
successful development of these commercial [space] activities, and there are [sic] a much
broader range of space actors.”).
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Musk, said during a press conference in Cape Canaveral in 2018:
“We want a new space race. Races are exciting.”21 Musk’s company,
SpaceX, has become one of the most revolutionary actors in the
space industry. Founded in 2002 “with the ultimate goal of enabling
people to live on other planets,” SpaceX became the first private
entity to deliver cargo to and from the International Space Station
in 2012.22 SpaceX continues to develop state-of-the-art rockets, and
it was the first private entity to launch humans into orbit on May
30, 2020.23
Jeff Bezos is another visionary billionaire whose company, Blue
Origin, seeks to remake how humans approach outer space.24 By
striving “to build[ ] a road to space,”25 Blue Origin has played a
leading role in developing reusable rocket systems, which make the
company’s launch services significantly more affordable and
sustainable.26 Blue Origin is also a market leader in the space
tourism industry, and prospective astronauts will soon be able to
make an eleven-minute trip to space on board the New Shepard
rocket.27
21. Alan Yuhas, The New Space Race: How Billionaires Launched the Next Era of
Exploration, GUARDIAN (Feb. 9, 2018, 11:31 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/science/2018/
feb/09/new-space-race-billionaires-elon-musk-jeff-bezos [https://perma.cc/7KDB-RG52].
22. About SpaceX, supra note 2. SpaceX has many other significant achievements, such
as its 2018 launch of Falcon Heavy, “the world’s most powerful operational rocket by a factor
of two.” Id. The company “is working on a next generation of fully reusable launch vehicles
that will be the most powerful ever built, capable of carrying humans to Mars and other
destinations in the solar system.” Id.
23. Jonathan O’Callaghan, SpaceX Makes History with First-Ever Human Rocket Launch
for NASA, FORBES (May 30, 2020, 3:25 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/jonathanocallaghan/
2020/05/30/spacex-makes-history-with-first-ever-human-rocket-launch-for-nasa/#5f861dda
5321 [https://perma.cc/95J2-4AFS].
24. See Blue’s Mission, BLUE ORIGIN, https://www.blueorigin.com/our-mission [https://
perma.cc/T7VW-DCMN].
25. Id.
26. Reusability, BLUE ORIGIN, https://www.blueorigin.com/our-mission [https://perma.cc/
T7VW-DCMN].
27. Become an Astronaut, BLUE ORIGIN, https://www.blueorigin.com/new-shepard/become-
an-astronaut/ [https://perma.cc/YX87-77QX]. Interested and adventurous readers should see
Interested in Reserving a Window Seat?, BLUE ORIGIN, https://www.blueorigin.com/new-
shepard/become-an-astronaut/reserve-a-seat [https://perma.cc/3BYP-VDA5].
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The third “space baron” of note is Sir Richard Branson,28 founder
of Virgin Galactic (as well as its larger parent company, Virgin
Group).29 To improve public access to space, Virgin Galactic focuses
on “developing and operating a new generation of space vehicles to
open space for everyone.”30 Its reusable SpaceShipTwo spaceflight
system is the world’s first passenger-carrying spaceship built by a
company and operated in commercial service.31 In this way, Virgin
Galactic is locked in a race with its industry rivals to reach previ-
ously unthinkable milestones in space technology and development.
This private space race is changing all the old space industry
rules. As companies compete to create reusable rocket materials and
more efficient spacecraft designs, the costs of entering space have
dramatically decreased.32 The private sector is taking notice. Indeed,
with lower costs in the space industry, outer space is now more
attainable than ever for private entities.33
Many entrepreneurs have responded and developed ambitious
plans to send more satellites into orbit.34 For instance, Princess
28. Bennett, supra note 1, at 63 (“Today, a new group of ‘Space Barons’ featuring Elon
Musk, Jeff Bezos, and Sir Richard Branson, have started a new space race and raised the
stakes.”).
29. Find a Virgin Company, VIRGIN, virgin.com/company [https://perma.cc/W7MJ-PNYX];
Gwyn Topham & Julia Kollewe, Richard Branson’s Virgin Galactic Prepares to Go Public,
GUARDIAN (July 9, 2019, 3:28 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/science/2019/jul/09/richard-
branson-virgin-galactic-go-public [https://perma.cc/47VE-ADFG].
30. Mission, VIRGIN GALACTIC, https://www.virgingalactic.com/mission/ [https://perma.cc/
X76P-HAUV].
31. Id.
32. See Jamie Freed, Europe’s Arianespace Takes on SpaceX by Cutting Ariane 5 Rocket
Launch Price, REUTERS (Jan. 23, 2019, 3:38 AM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-ariane
space-asia/europes-arianespace-takes-on-spacex-by-cutting-ariane-5-rocket-launch-price-
idUSKCN1PH0Q9 [https://perma.cc/8PCA-E9C4] (“Europe’s Arianespace is discounting the
price of satellite launches with its Ariane 5 rockets as it competes against U.S. rival SpaceX
for customers before the release of the cheaper Ariane 6 rocket next year.”); Why Big Business
Is Making a Giant Leap into Space,KNOWLEDGE@WHARTON (June 4, 2019), https://knowledge.
wharton.upenn.edu/article/commercial-space-economy/ [https://perma.cc/PD9N-XER5]
(“Recently, the cost of launching a satellite has declined to about $60 million from $200
million because of reusable rockets ... with a potential drop to as low as $5 million. Satellite
mass production could decrease the cost from $500 million per satellite to $500,000.”); Yuhas,
supra note 21 (comparing the average cost of $60 million for SpaceX’s Falcon 9 launches with
NASA’s projected cost of about $1 billion for its Space Launch System launches).
33. See Why Big Business Is Making a Giant Leap into Space, supra note 32.
34. See, e.g., Expanded Partnership with SES to Give Princess Cruises First Access to
Ground-Breaking O3b mPOWER Satellite-Based Communications System, PR NEWSWIRE
(Feb. 3, 2020, 8:00 AM), https://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/expanded-partnership-
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Cruises, a leading subsidiary of the Carnival Corporation, recently
announced an expanded partnership with SES that will allow
Princess Cruises to become the first global cruise ship fleet with
access to SES’s satellite-based o3b mPOWER network.35 This
groundbreaking development will provide “unmatched and ubiqui-
tous global Wi-Fi service levels” to guests onboard Princess cruise
ships.36
Perhaps the most ambitious satellite plan is SpaceX’s Starlink
project. Starlink is SpaceX’s plan to build an internet satellite
network to beam high-speed internet anywhere on the planet.37
Early plans called for launching nearly 12,000 satellites flying in
low Earth orbit over the next eight years.38 Recent reports, however,
indicate SpaceX has increased that number to 42,000 satellites—
twenty times the number of operational satellites in orbit today.39
Several other companies, such as Amazon and Telesat, are compet-
ing with SpaceX to develop and operate a similar network of
internet satellites.40
This spike in private-sector space activity goes to show that space
is about to get much more crowded as companies and governments
capitalize on the new access humans have to space.41 A tremendous
increase in the number of space objects appears to be one of the
many ways in which spacefaring companies are transforming the
space industry. NASA technocrats no longer monopolize the
industry. Instead, the space industry of today is soaring to new
heights on innovation and competition between private actors.
with-ses-to-give-princess-cruises-first-access-to-ground-breaking-o3b-mpower-satellite-based-
communications-system-300997449.html [https://perma.cc/E5VA-2J4F].
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Dave Mosher, SpaceX May Want to Launch 42,000 Internet Satellites—About 5 Times
More Spacecraft than Humanity Has Ever Flown, BUS. INSIDER (Oct. 17, 2019), https://www.
businessinsider.my/spacex-starlink-internet-satellites-itc-filing-30000-additional-42000-total-
2019-10/ [https://perma.cc/4UQU-WMFH].
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Id.; Michael Sheetz & Magdalena Petrova, Why in the Next Decade Companies Will
Launch Thousands More Satellites than in All of History, CNBC (Dec. 17, 2019, 10:57 AM),
https://www.cnbc.com/2019/12/14/spacex-oneweb-and-amazon-to-launch-thousands-more-
satellites-in-2020s.html [https://perma.cc/A67Y-HJE9].
41. See Albert, supra note 6, at 234; Kehrer, supra note 1, at 189-90.
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II. THE TREATY FRAMEWORK GOVERNING LIABILITY IN SPACE
Five United Nations treaties form “the nucleus of [international]
space law.”42 These treaties are legally binding upon the states that
ratify them, and they place numerous obligations on spacefaring
states.43 The first of these treaties, the Outer Space Treaty of 1967,
is “[r]egarded as the ‘Magna Carta’ of outer space, [and it estab-
lished the foundational] principles concerning the exploration and
use of outer space.”44 Over the next twelve years, the international
community supplemented the Outer Space Treaty with four
additional treaties that collectively comprise the legal framework
governing human activity in space.45 Within these treaties, the issue
of liability in space was first addressed in the Outer Space Treaty.46
The Liability Convention subsequently expanded on the principles
of international space liability.47
A. The Outer Space Treaty
Article VI of the Outer Space Treaty of 1967 provides a founda-
tional principle of space law that guides its treatment of private
actors and liability allocation in space.48 Article VI posits that
signatory states “shall bear international responsibility for national
activities in outer space ... whether such activities are carried on by
governmental agencies or by nongovernmental entities.”49 In other
42. TANJA MASSON-ZWAAN & MAHULENA HOFMANN, INTRODUCTION TO SPACE LAW 15-16
(4th ed. 2019); Zhao, supra note 7.
43. MASSON-ZWAAN & HOFMANN, supra note 42, at 15; Dempsey, supra note 20, at 5-6.
44. Adrian Taghdiri, Note, Flags of Convenience and the Commercial Space Flight
Industry: The Inadequacy of Current International Law to Address the Opportune Registration
of Space Vehicles in Flag States, 19 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L. 405, 408 (2013).
45. Id. The subsequent treaties are: (1) the 1968 Rescue Agreement governing the
recovery and return of foreign astronauts and space objects; (2) the 1972 Liability Convention
governing liability for damage caused by space objects; (3) the 1975 Registration Convention
governing the registration of space objects with the United Nations; and (4) the 1979 Moon
Agreement governing space activity on the Moon. Id.
46. See Dempsey, supra note 20, at 9.
47. Id.
48. See id. at 6.
49. Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of
Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies art. VI, Jan. 27, 1967, 18 U.S.T.
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words, Article VI opened the door for private activities in space,
provided that “the appropriate state exercise[ ] authority and ...
supervision over [the private actors].”50 This article is significant
because it is the only provision that mentions private actors in
space, who had no formal standing under any of the space treaties.51
In this way, Article VI represented a consequential compromise
between the United States and the Soviet Union.52 In negotiating
the Outer Space Treaty, the United States wanted to involve private
parties in the discussions.53 The Soviet Union, however, sought to
limit space activities to only states.54 Ultimately, the superpowers
compromised to allow Article VI to open the door for private entities
to operate in space, yet the treaty guarantees national governments
will play the decisive role in governing space activity.55
Articles VII and VIII of the Outer Space Treaty build on this
principle of state preeminence in space. Article VII maintains that
“[e]ach State Party to the Treaty that launches or procures the
launching of an object into outer space ... and each State Party from
whose territory or facility an object is launched, is internationally
liable for damage to another State Party.”56 Relatedly, Article VIII
proclaims that each state “on whose registry an object launched into
outer space [has been registered] shall retain jurisdiction and
control” over that object while in outer space.57 Both of these articles
provided the key foundational principles relating to liability in space
on which the Liability Convention expanded when it was drafted
five years later.58
B. The Liability Convention
Building on these articles of the Outer Space Treaty, the Liability
Convention of 1972 constructs a comprehensive framework by which
2410, 610 U.N.T.S. 205 [hereinafter Outer Space Treaty].
50. Dempsey, supra note 20, at 6.
51. Von der Dunk, supra note 8, at 423.
52. See Dempsey, supra note 20, at 6.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Outer Space Treaty, supra note 49, art. VII.
57. Id. art. VIII.
58. MASSON-ZWAAN & HOFMANN, supra note 42, at 20.
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liability for damage caused by space objects is assigned.59 In the
preamble, signatory states recognized “the need to elaborate
effective international rules and procedures concerning liability for
damage caused by space objects and to ensure, in particular, the
prompt payment of a full and equitable measure of compensation to
victims of such damage.”60
The body of the Liability Convention assigns liability on launch-
ing states to pay compensation for damage caused by their space
objects.61 The Convention defines “launching State” as either “[a]
State which launches or procures the launching of a space object,”
or “[a] State from whose territory or facility a space object is
launched.”62 This definition means that four states can qualify as
“launching states” for purposes of the Liability Convention: (1) the
state that launches a space object; (2) the state that procures the
launching of a space object; (3) the state whose territory has been
used for a launch; and (4) “the [s]tate from whose facility a space
object is launched.”63 As such, victim states can recover the full
amount of damage from any of these states.64 If multiple states
qualify as the launching state of a space object, then those states
may be held jointly and severally liable for the damage.65
In determining the standard of liability, the Liability Convention
distinguishes between the two locations where damage may occur.66
On the one hand, if the damage occurs on Earth or to aircraft in
flight, then the launching state is strictly liable for any damage
caused by its space object.67 For example, this strict liability would
be invoked if debris from a space object were to fall to the earth and
damage property in a foreign country.68 On the other hand, if the
damage occurs in outer space, then the launching state is “liable
only if the damage is due to its fault or the fault of persons for whom
59. See Dempsey, supra note 20, at 9-10.
60. Convention on International Liability for Damage Caused by Space Objects pmbl.,
Mar. 29, 1972, 24 U.S.T. 2389, 2391, 961 U.N.T.S. 187, 189 [hereinafter Liability Convention].
61. Dempsey, supra note 20, art. I.
62. Liability Convention, supra note 60, at 2392.
63. MASSON-ZWAAN & HOFMANN, supra note 42, at 27.
64. Id.
65. Liability Convention, supra note 60, art. V.
66. See id. art. II.
67. Id.
68. See id.
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it is responsible.”69 For example, this fault liability would be invoked
if two objects were to collide in space.70
If a launching state’s space object causes damage, the Liability
Convention establishes a detailed process through which the victim
state can claim compensation from the launching state. First, a
victim state must present a claim for compensation to the relevant
launching state no later than one year after the damage occurs.71
The parties must then attempt to settle the claim through diplo-
matic channels.72 If the parties fail to arrive at a settlement within
one year, however, they must then establish a Claims Commission
to adjudicate the claim.73
The Claims Commission is composed of three members: one
appointed by the launching state, one appointed by the victim state,
and one—the Chairman—chosen jointly by the parties.74 The Claims
Commission then decides the merits of the claim and determines the
amount that the launching state must pay, if any.75 The Commis-
sion’s decision “shall be final and binding if the parties have so
agreed; otherwise the Commission shall render a final and recom-
mendatory award, which the parties shall consider in good faith.”76
In other words, both parties must agree to accept the Commission’s
decision for it to bind the parties.77 If one or both parties object, then
the decision is merely “recommendatory.”78
The Liability Convention provides a thorough and comprehensive
framework through which parties can settle claims relating to
damage by space objects. Nevertheless, parties have invoked the
terms of the Convention only once in history.79 That incident occur-
red in 1978 when Cosmos 954, a Soviet spy satellite, depressurized
69. Id. art. III.
70. See id.
71. Id. art. X, ¶ 1.
72. Id. art. II.
73. Id. art. XIV.
74. Id. art. XV, ¶ 1.
75. Id. art. XVIII.
76. Id. art. XIX, ¶ 2.
77. See id.
78. Id.
79. Kehrer, supra note 1, at 185.
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and deorbited to Earth.80 The satellite crashed and scattered debris
over 124,000 square miles of Canadian wilderness.81 Because the
satellite was powered by a nuclear reactor, the debris was radioac-
tive and required a high degree of care and urgency to clean up.82
Canada located and disposed of the dangerous debris at a cost of
C$13.97 million.83 About one year after the incident, Canada
presented a claim against the Soviet Union under the Liability
Convention for C$6.94 million for the cleanup costs.84 The Soviet
Union, however, “argue[d] that Canada had taken excessive
measures to restore the environment” and paid only C$3 million to
settle the claim.85 Because the countries jointly settled the claim,
they did not need to establish a Claims Commission to adjudicate
the case.86 However, because the damage occurred on Earth, the
Liability Convention would have held the Soviet Union strictly
liable for the damage if the claim had been adjudicated.87 To date,
this incident remains the only claim brought under the Liability
Convention.88
Yet, numerous other incidents on Earth could have been grounds
for invoking the Liability Convention. Indeed, satellites have
reentered Earth on several occasions in recent decades. In 1979,
Skylab, a NASA space station weighing seventy-four tons, crashed
into the Australian countryside.89 In 2011, a twenty-year-old NASA
satellite fell to the earth and scattered debris across the Pacific
80. Luke Punnakanta, Note, Space Torts: Applying Nuisance and Negligence to Orbital
Debris, 86 S. CAL. L. REV. 163, 170 (2012).
81. Id.
82. Id.; Steve Weintz, Operation Morning Light: The Nuclear Satellite That Almost
Decimated America, NAT’L INTEREST (Nov. 23, 2015), https://nationalinterest.org/feature/
operation-morning-light-the-nuclear-satellite-almost-14411 [https://perma.cc/T6ZK-96B7].
83. Punnakanta, supra note 80, at 170.
84. Van C. Ernest, Note, Third Party Liability of the Private Space Industry: To Pay What
No One Has Paid Before, 41 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 503, 525 (1991).
85. Id.
86. See id.
87. Punnakanta, supra note 80, at 177.
88. Id. at 176.
89. Id. at 171. When NASA officials came to collect the debris, the town of Esperance,
Western Australia, good-naturedly issued them a $400 fine for littering. When Western
Australia Fined NASA, TRACES (Apr. 17, 2018), https://www.tracesmagazine.com.au/2018/04/
when-western-australia-fined-nasa/ [https://perma.cc/Y6LW-6DKS]. NASA never paid the
fine, though a California radio host launched a donation campaign for his listeners thirty
years later to finally pay the fine for NASA. Id.
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Ocean.90 Perhaps the most notable incident of space object reentry
occurred in 1997 when a falling piece of space debris from a rocket
hit a woman in Tulsa, Oklahoma.91
Moreover, several other incidents in outer space could have
invoked the Liability Convention. The first recorded collision
between two satellites in outer space occurred on February 10, 2009,
when an American commercial satellite collided with a decommis-
sioned Russian military satellite.92 The collision destroyed the
satellites and created at least two thousand pieces of large space
debris in Earth’s orbit.93 More recently, in September 2019, one of
SpaceX’s new Starlink internet satellites narrowly avoided a
collision with one of the European Space Agency’s (ESA) wind-
monitoring satellites.94 As the odds of a collision neared 1-in-1000,
the ESA attempted to contact SpaceX.95 SpaceX claimed that it did
not receive the ESA’s messages due to a software bug, however, so
the ESA unilaterally adjusted the orbit of its satellite to avoid
risking a collision.96 While none of these incidents resulted in a
party filing a claim under the Liability Convention, they collectively
illustrate the tremendous risk of damage that accompanies space-
related activities.
90. Punnakanta, supra note 80, at 170-71.
91. Tony Long, Jan. 22, 1997: Heads Up, Lottie! It’s Space Junk!, WIRED (Jan. 22, 2009,
12:00 AM), https://www.wired.com/2009/01/jan-22-1997-heads-up-lottie-its-space-junk/
[https://perma.cc/TKM5-ZX7P]. Lottie Williams remains “the only person believed to have
been [struck] by a piece of space debris.” Id. She did not sustain injuries from the incident. Id.
(“She was struck a glancing blow, and the debris was relatively light and probably traveling
at a low velocity. It was also subject to wind currents, which mitigated the impact even
further.”).
92. Scott Kerr, Liability for Space Debris Collisions and the Kessler Syndrome (Part 1),
SPACE REV. (Dec. 11, 2017), http://www.thespacereview.com/article/3387/1 [https://perma.cc/
B97C-BGA7].
93. Id.
94. Dave Mosher, Billionaires Plan to Launch Tens of Thousands of New Satellites.
Experts Are Working Hard to Ensure This Doesn’t Lead to a Disaster that Ends Human Access
to Orbit, BUS.INSIDER (Dec. 27, 2019, 2:25 PM), https://www.businessinsider.com/space-junk-
kessler-syndrome-chain-reaction-prevention-2018-3 [https://perma.cc/8SVK-MXKY].
95. Id.
96. Loren Grush, A Bug in SpaceX’s Communication System Kept the Company in the
Dark About Potential Satellite Collision, VERGE (Sept. 4, 2019, 1:36 PM), https://www.the
verge.com/2019/9/3/20847243/spacex-starlink-satellite-european-space-agency-aeolus-
conjunction-space-debris [https://perma.cc/MND5-CND4].
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Certainly, as the number of space objects in orbit increases
exponentially in the coming years, the risk of one of these space
objects causing damage will inevitably skyrocket.97 The Liability
Convention, therefore, will play an increasingly important role in
assigning liability for these incidents, and the limits of the Liability
Convention will surely be tested in the coming years. Given that
companies are likely to dominate outer space in the future, the
Liability Convention should provide an efficient and effective
process for assigning liability between these companies.
III. THE LIABILITY CONVENTION FAILS TO PROVIDE AN EFFECTIVE
LIABILITY REGIME AS APPLIED TO SPACEFARING COMPANIES
The governing treaty framework was drafted at a time when
national governments—namely, the United States and the Soviet
Union—monopolized outer space activity.98 National governments
were thought to be the only entities with enough resources to
undertake a mission to outer space.99 As a result, the procedures
that the space treaties establish are notably “state-centric.”100
Indeed, the space treaties barely mention private space activity.
Of the treaties that concern liability, the only provision that directly
relates to the private sector is the Outer Space Treaty’s general
toleration of private activity in space, as long as the appropriate
state authorizes and supervises the private actors.101 The Liability
Convention does not directly mention private activities.102 Conse-
quently, the Liability Convention has serious gaps when applied to
companies whose space objects have damaged foreign parties.
97. See Mosher, supra note 94 (“As we rocket more stuff into space, the odds of one
crashing into another at very high speeds inextricably goes up.”).
98. Albert, supra note 6, at 236.
99. Von der Dunk, supra note 8, at 419.
100. See St. John, supra note 5, at 687 (noting that the space treaties “are products of the
Westphalian state system”).
101. Dempsey, supra note 20, at 6. Generally, states establish licensing systems and
regulatory oversight procedures to comply with these requirements. Id.
102. See Liability Convention, supra note 60.
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A. “Launching State” Ambiguities
First, the Convention’s definition of “launching state” can make
it difficult to pinpoint which state should be held liable for a
company’s space objects.103 This problem is best illustrated by the
2009 satellite collision between the defunct Russian military
satellite, Kosmos 2252, and the operational American commercial
satellite, Iridium 33. An American company owned Iridium 33, but
the satellite was launched from a Russian-owned spaceport.104 After
the collision, Iridium could have filed a claim for compensation
under the Liability Convention.105 Had Iridium done so, Iridium
would have had to enlist the U.S. State Department to negotiate on
its behalf with the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs.106 Because
Iridium was incorporated in the United States, Iridium could have
argued that the United States “procured” the launch, and therefore
should be considered the relevant launching state according to
Article I of the Liability Convention.107
The Russians could have argued, however, that the definition of
“launching state” in Article I mandates that Iridium 33 be consid-
ered a Russian space object because it was launched from a Russian
spaceport.108 As such, Russia could have contended that it should be
allowed to assign liability for the collision internally because Article
VII of the Liability Convention prohibits two parties from the same
country from invoking the terms of the Convention against each
other.109 The parties would be at an impasse if they failed to settle
this jurisdictional matter, which would prevent them from achieving
an equitable adjudication of the issue.110
103. Space Law Is Inadequate for the Boom in Human Activity There, ECONOMIST (July 18,
2019), https://www.economist.com/international/2019/07/18/space-law-is-inadequate-for-the-
boom-in-human-activity-there [https://perma.cc/DK2E-7HP8] [hereinafter Space Law Is
Inadequate]; see also MASSON-ZWAAN & HOFMANN, supra note 42, at 27 (“[I]t is likely that
several States can be considered as launching States and held liable for damage.”).
104. Space Law Is Inadequate, supra note 103.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. MASSON-ZWAAN & HOFMANN, supra note 42, at 27.
108. See Space Law Is Inadequate, supra note 103.
109. See Liability Convention, supra note 60, art. VII; Space Law Is Inadequate, supra note
103.
110. See Space Law Is Inadequate, supra note 103.
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This problem stems from the Liability Convention’s failure to
illustrate how to proceed should multiple states have a reasonable
claim to being the claimant state, yet one of these states is also the
launching state of a company’s space object.111 Should the launching
states be jointly and severally liable as provided for in Article V112
when multiple states act as the launching state? That approach
would violate Article VII’s prohibition on intrastate parties invoking
the Liability Convention against each other.113 Should Article VII
prohibit a launching state from also asserting it is the claimant
state in the event of multiple launching states? That strategy would
conflict with Article I’s definition of launching state.114 The Liability
Convention does not provide answers to these questions. By
establishing a regime based on state liability, the Liability Conven-
tion has created ambiguity as to which states should act as the
representatives of companies engaged in space activity.
This ambiguity significantly diminishes the Liability Conven-
tion’s efficacy because it creates uncertainty as to the identity of
the parties involved in the claim.115 Furthermore, it forces the
parties to debate ancillary procedural issues rather than the claim’s
substantive elements.116 As companies increasingly become the
major actors in space, this ambiguity in the Liability Convention
will play a more significant role when companies pursue liability
claims against one another. This problem is further exacerbated by
the fact that most modern spacefaring companies are multinational
corporations with operations and spaceports in several countries
across the globe.117 As such, it will become increasingly difficult to
isolate the states through which companies should negotiate their
claims.118 Therefore, the “state-centric”119 procedures of the Liability
111. See id.
112. See Liability Convention, supra note 60, art. V.
113. See id. art. VII.
114. See id. art. I.
115. See Space Law Is Inadequate, supra note 103.
116. See supra notes 103-13 and accompanying text.
117. See, e.g., Company Profile, ARIANESPACE, https://www.arianespace.com/company-
profile/ [https://perma.cc/AQ4D-XHTL] (noting that Arianespace has launch sites in two
different countries, employees dedicated to customer service in five different countries, and
an overall “global presence”).
118. See id.
119. St. John, supra note 5, at 689.
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Convention raise critical questions when companies become the
primary players involved in pursuing liability claims for damage
caused by space objects.
B. Flag States
Flag states represent a significant and growing threat to the
international liability regime governing outer space.120 The “flag
state” concept comes from maritime law and commonly means that
“the owner of a vessel [wishes to avoid] an obligation [to] a country
with strict[ ] standards for [vessel] registry.”121 Consequently, the
owner will register the vessel with a flag state that has more lenient
registration requirements purely for economic purposes.122 By flying
this “flag of convenience,” the owner is able to avoid certain taxation
or regulatory requirements of its home state, which therefore
reduces the company’s operating costs.123 Flag states are often
criticized for fostering criminal activity, poor working conditions,
and environmental damage due to “loose” regulations and oversight
by the flag states.124
Many scholars have recognized the dangers of flag states in the
space industry.125 Indeed, commercial space companies may be
120. See, e.g., Albert, supra note 6, at 251-52 (“Launching from states with lower safety
standards increases the potential for catastrophic launch events.”); Dempsey, supra note 20,
at 43 (“It would be shameful if commercial space activities were attracted to the jurisdictions
with the lowest taxes and lowest cost regulatory structure, at the expense of safety and
environmental protections.”); Taghdiri, supra note 44, at 417 (“As a result of the inadequate
dispute settlement procedures [of the Liability Convention], a flags of convenience problem
may soon arise in the commercial spaceflight industry.”).
121. Albert, supra note 6, at 251.
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Taghdiri, supra note 44, at 418. For example, the Deepwater Horizon oil rig that
exploded in the Gulf of Mexico in 2010 caused enormous environmental damage. Id. The rig
was registered in the Marshall Islands, and “U.S. government reviews of the [disaster]
criticized the Marshall Islands’ oversight of the vessel.” Id. U.S. government officials
“suggested that the foreign registration was an effort to evade strict safety standards,” such
as those of the United States. Id.
125. See, e.g., Dempsey, supra note 20, at 43 (“States should attempt to harmonize their
laws with other States, so that global uniformity might be enhanced, and flag-of-convenience
type forum shopping discouraged.”); Taghdiri, supra note 44, at 419-20 (“[A]s the commercial
space industry develops, attempts to obtain cost economies and attempts to remain
competitive in the industry may pose a threat to both the environment and space tourists.”).
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incentivized to “seek out the most convenient state for launch,
[which will] most likely [be] the state that provides the most
liability coverage and has the least safety precautions.”126 As a
result, more launches from states with lower safety standards
heightens the risk for dangerous launch accidents or space object
malfunctions.127
Furthermore, states that offer the “best deal” to commercial space
companies may also be less likely to pay damages if an injured party
files a claim for compensation under the Liability Convention, which
could prevent the injured party from recovering for the damage.128
One of the primary goals of the Liability Convention is “to ensure ...
the prompt payment ... of a full and equitable measure of compensa-
tion to victims of [space object] damage.”129 The Convention’s toler-
ance of flag states—which may jeopardize the ability of victims to be
compensated for their damage—is therefore particularly distressing.
The problems associated with flag states arise from the patch-
work of national space legislation that states have adopted to govern
their commercial space industries.130 To comply with their obliga-
tions under the Outer Space Treaty, spacefaring states have
generally established licensing and regulatory regimes to govern
commercial space companies and ensure that they adhere to the
international rules outlined in the treaties.131 Additionally, national
space legislation allows states to promote certain space policies that
are in the national interest.132 As a result, many states have
developed comprehensive licensing, regulatory, insurance, and
indemnificatory regimes for spacefaring companies operating within
their jurisdiction.133 These regimes are all different from each other,
however, which leads to the problems associated with flag states in
the space industry.134
126. Albert, supra note 6, at 251.
127. Id. at 251-52.
128. Id. at 250.
129. Liability Convention, supra note 60, pmbl.
130. See Albert, supra note 6, at 251.
131. MASSON-ZWAAN & HOFMANN, supra note 42, at 47.
132. Id.
133. Dempsey, supra note 20, at 14-41.
134. See Albert, supra note 6, at 250 (“This variation among nation states gives commercial
space companies a variety of options to choose from when deciding where to launch.”);
Dempsey, supra note 20, at 42 (“[T]he law addressing space activities varies extensively from
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The Liability Convention has created an “uneven playing field”
for spacefaring states, which in turn has created a dangerous
environment for the space industry.135 Consequently, a structural
change to the Liability Convention is necessary to protect against
the dangers that flag states create. 
C. Lack of Enforcement Mechanisms
The Liability Convention lacks teeth when applied to private
parties, which creates strong incentives for spacefaring companies
to avoid invoking the Convention in a dispute regarding space object
damage.136 Because the crux of the Convention’s dispute resolution
procedure relies on good faith negotiations between the parties, the
Convention is premised on the idea that the parties can come to a
mutual understanding regarding liability and compensation for the
damage in dispute.137 Article XIV calls for the establishment of a
Claims Commission only after the parties have unsuccessfully
negotiated for a year through diplomatic channels.138 Even the
Claims Commission’s final adjudication relies on the good faith of
the parties: Article XIX maintains that the decision of the Commis-
sion is binding only if the parties agree for it to be binding.139 If they
do not agree, then the Commission’s decision is merely “recommen-
datory,” and “the parties shall consider [the decision] in good
faith.”140 Consequently, a party seeking to avoid liability at all costs
could take advantage of the Liability Convention’s weak enforce-
ment mechanisms and could refuse to participate in any meaningful
dispute resolution under the Convention.141 The Convention’s
State to State.”).
135. Albert, supra note 6, at 250.
136. See H.L. VAN TRAA-ENGELMAN, COMMERCIAL UTILIZATION OF OUTER SPACE 65 (1993)
(“In particular, the nature of the decision delivered by the Claims Commission, which shall
be final and binding only ‘if the parties have so agreed,’ represents a great deal of insecurity
in this respect.” (footnote omitted)).
137. See Kehrer, supra note 1, at 187 (“The Liability Convention’s critical dependence on
good-faith negotiation is not the only mechanical difficulty the liability regime faces.”).
138. Liability Convention, supra note 60, art. XIV.
139. Id. art. XIX, ¶ 2.
140. Id.
141. See Kehrer, supra note 1, at 187 (“[I]f the launching state is hostile to the victim state
or if it determines that the liability regime is unfair as applied to launching states generally,
it will simply not participate in dispute resolution.”).
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procedures therefore lead to uncertainty and fail to set forth an
effective liability regime for spacefaring companies.
Because of the Liability Convention’s ineffective enforcement
mechanisms, many spacefaring companies are finding ways to
prevent the Convention from being invoked if their space objects
were to damage an international party.142 In fact, many companies
are contracting around liability issues to resolve disputes extrajudi-
cially.143 Companies include cross-waivers of liability into their
contracts with each other, such that “each party agrees to bear its
own risk.”144 If an issue arises, the parties will adjudicate the
dispute as a matter of contract law in municipal court, rather than
through the terms of the Liability Convention.145 In this way,
companies seek to create “some certainty about the law governing
the[ir] dispute[s].”146
These tactics by spacefaring companies illustrate that the
Liability Convention is ineffective and woefully underdeveloped as
applied to disputes between private parties. If private enterprise is
to continue leading the exploration and development of outer space
in the years to come, then the international liability regime should
be updated to provide spacefaring companies with effective mecha-
nisms to govern liability disputes between private parties.
IV. AMEND THE LIABILITY CONVENTION
As demonstrated in Part III, the Liability Convention is ill-
equipped to govern international liability disputes between
spacefaring companies. While the drafters of the Liability Conven-
tion did not preclude space activity by private actors, they did not
account for it either.147 In an age where private actors are rapidly
expanding their activity and presence in outer space, this absence
142. St. John, supra note 5, at 712.
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. Id. at 712-13.
146. Id. at 713 (“Business will not let an imperfect treaty structure hinder space
development.”).
147. See Zhao, supra note 7 (“[L]egal issues related to space commercialization were not
the main regulatory targets for these five treaties, which is understandable in view of the
time when these treaties were drafted.”).
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is particularly troubling. Consequently, this Note argues that the
international community should amend the Liability Convention to
account precisely for the activities of companies in space. It is time
to assign liability directly on the companies whose space objects
damage an international party.
A. An International Approach Is Necessary
This Note calls for an international approach to amend the space
liability regime. An international agreement would create a
universal standard by which all space object liability claims would
be adjudicated.148 This unified approach is necessary for two
primary reasons.
First, variance among national space laws causes the problems
associated with flag states.149 Indeed, national laws regulating space
activity, such as licensing and indemnification requirements, vary
extensively among states.150 Some States—like the United States—
have enacted a comprehensive regulatory regime, while others have
a more meager regime.151 To reduce regulatory costs, companies may
choose to operate in states with lenient regulatory and indemnifi-
cation requirements, at the expense of safety and reliability.152 As
such, an international effort to set liability procedures is preferable
because it would help mitigate the variance in national liability
requirements for the space industry. Spacefaring companies there-
fore would have to comply with liability procedures that the
148. See Rachel Mitchell, Into the Final Frontier: The Expanse of Space Commercialization,
83 MO. L. REV. 429, 448 (2018).
149. See supra Part III.B.
150. Dempsey, supra note 20, at 31, 42; see also Mitchell, supra note 149, at 448 (“The lack
of a comprehensive regulatory scheme for commercial activities could create a new ‘Wild West’
in outer space.”).
151. See Dempsey, supra note 20, at 25-27. For example, the United States requires every
U.S. citizen to obtain authorization from the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) “to
launch, reenter, or operate a launch or reentry site” for space objects anywhere in the world.
Id. at 26. The FAA considers “public health and safety, safety of property, and U.S. national
security and foreign policy concerns” when evaluating a launch application and regulating
these launches. Id. Conversely, Argentina has much less stringent authorization
requirements. Id. at 27-28. The government requires merely that actors register with the
government before engaging in space activities. Id.
152. Taghdiri, supra note 44, at 419-20.
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international community agrees are adequate for the industry, thus
reducing the threats that flag states pose.
Second, an international effort to reconcile the Liability Conven-
tion with the rise of commercial space companies would play a
crucial role in fostering international cooperation in space. Cur-
rently, each of the five governing space treaties emphasize that
humans should develop outer space for the benefit of all countries
and humankind.153 The introduction of a uniform international
liability regime would promote global cooperation and recognize the
shared international interests in developing outer space.154 This
cooperation will become increasingly necessary as humans must
collectively confront the new challenges arising in space, such as the
proliferation of space debris.155 Outer space has long been treated as
“the province of all mankind,”156 which “is not subject to national
appropriation by claim of sovereignty, by means of use or occupa-
tion, or by any other means.”157 As such, a comprehensive interna-
tional liability regime would protect the shared interests of all
countries and humankind in outer space.
Many scholars argue, however, that domestic legislation has
sufficiently filled in the Liability Convention’s gaps; therefore,
changes to the liability regime in space should be made at the
national level.158 Indeed, an increasing number of states have
153. See, e.g., Liability Convention, supra note 60, pmbl. (noting in the first clause of the
preamble that the state parties “[r]ecogniz[e] the common interest of all mankind in
furthering the exploration and use of outer space for peaceful purposes”); Outer Space Treaty,
supra note 49, pmbl. (noting the state parties “[b]eliev[e] that the exploration and use of outer
space should be carried on for the benefit of all peoples”).
154. Space Law Treaties and Principles, UNITED NATIONS OFF. FOR OUTER SPACE AFFS.,
https://www.unoosa.org/oosa/en/ourwork/spacelaw/treaties.html [https://perma.cc/5ZFB-
H22Q].
155. See St. John, supra note 5, at 688 (“If space debris is left unchecked, scientists worry
that low Earth orbit will become unusable.”).
156. Outer Space Treaty, supra note 49, art. I.
157. Id. art. II.
158. See Megan McCauley, Comment, Astro-Not? How Current Space Treaties Could Fall
Short of Protecting Future Space Tourists, 50 U. PAC. L. REV. 453, 484-85 (2019) (citing Jason
Krause, The Outer Space Treaty Turns 50. Can It Survive a New Space Race?, ABA J. (Apr.
2017), http://www.abajournal.com/magazine/article/outer_space_treaty) (noting that one
scholar has argued that “the development of national regulatory systems for space activities
may be a better alternative than adding to or amending the current treaty regime because of
the difficulty of obtaining widespread support for one harmonized policy, in light of the
multitude of interests in play”); Zhao, supra note 7 (“[N]ational space legislation can also
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passed national legislation to govern the space operations of
companies in their jurisdiction.159 For example, many States with
national space legislation have indemnification mechanisms that
require a company to reimburse the state for at least a portion of the
damage for which the state is held liable under the Liability
Convention.160 In other words, States can pass national legislation
requiring spacefaring companies to pay some of the damage caused
by their space objects, thus filling in a significant gap of the
Liability Convention.
In addition, supporters of the current regime will point out that
injured parties may pursue legal remedies in municipal courts.161
The Liability Convention does not preclude injured parties from
filing lawsuits in the domestic courts of the launching state,162 and
these lawsuits would likely invoke that country’s tort laws to
remedy the damage.163 As such, injured parties have an alternative
forum in which to dispute their claim if they prefer to avoid working
through their national government in the Liability Convention
process.164 Some see this provision of the Liability Convention as
providing adequate flexibility for parties damaged by a company’s
space objects.
While national legislation can effectively fill some gaps of the
Liability Convention, this Note prefers an international effort
because it would create a more stable and inclusive liability process.
First, flag states in the space industry could seriously undermine
provide a useful attempt in providing rules for space commercialization.”).
159. MASSON-ZWAAN & HOFMANN, supra note 42, at 48-50; see also Dempsey, supra note
20, at 5 (“The rapid emergence of national space legislation is the fastest growing area of
Space Law.”).
160. Von der Dunk, supra note 8, at 424.
161. St. John, supra note 5, at 699 (“If a party needs more certainty than the Liability
Convention’s claims process can provide, the treaty structure allows injured parties to assert
claims in other venues.”).
162. Liability Convention, supra note 60, art. XI, ¶ 2 (“Nothing in this Convention shall
prevent a State, or natural or juridical persons it might represent, from pursuing a claim in
the courts or administrative tribunals or agencies of a launching State.”). However, parties
may not simultaneously pursue claims in multiple venues. Id. (“A State shall not, however,
be entitled to present a claim under this Convention in respect of the same damage for which
a claim is being pursued in the courts or administrative tribunals or agencies of a launching
State.”).
163. Ernest, supra note 84, at 506.
164. See Liability Convention, supra note 60, art. XI, ¶ 2.
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humanity’s ability to explore and develop outer space.165 A unified
international liability regime for the space industry is the most
direct manner by which to prevent flag states and stabilize the
global space industry.166 Second, an international regime would
reflect the shared interests of all humankind in exploring and
developing space.167 Whereas a national regime leads to liability
policies that benefit only the spacefaring entities of that nation, an
international regime based on discussion and compromise by the
international community would create a liability regime that works
for every party.168
Third, victim parties may prefer to avoid the domestic courts of
the launching party.169 Indeed, national courts may take a biased
approach to adjudicating a dispute in favor of the domestic party.170
An international liability forum therefore should be available to
victim parties to protect them from biased national institutions of
the launching party. Consequently, the international community
should modernize the liability regime in outer space through a
global and inclusive process.
As such, because creating a new treaty is a time-consuming and
difficult process, amending the Liability Convention is the most
desirable means to effectuate an international liability regime.171
While the private space industry may push some States to oppose
amendment, “international agreements have been success[fully
negotiated] in many other areas of law.”172 With extensive negotia-
tion and strong political will, the parties to the Liability Convention
can trigger Article XXV and effectively amend the international
165. See supra Part III.B.
166. See supra Part III.B.
167. See supra notes 154-58 and accompanying text.
168. See supra notes 154-58 and accompanying text.
169. See Ernest, supra note 84, at 540 (noting that national courts may develop a “biased
treaty interpretation”).
170. Id.
171. See Mitchell, supra note 149, at 448 (calling the process of creating a new
international treaty “a slow and arduous process” and “likely to move too slowly to meet
imminent needs”).
172. Id. at 449. For example, the Antarctic Treaty has successfully governed international
activity in Antarctica, “fostering peaceful and joint scientific” endeavors in the area. Id. at
450.
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liability regime to account for the rise of the private space
industry.173
B. Hold Companies Directly Liable
This Note further proposes that the international community
amend the Liability Convention to hold companies directly liable for
damage caused by their space objects. In other words, a party
injured by a foreign company’s space object should have the
opportunity to hold that company directly liable for the damage,
rather than having to hold that company’s national government
liable. This amendment would streamline the liability process and
ensure that parties are held liable for damage they cause.
Today’s major spacefaring companies have the financial position
to take direct responsibility for their operations. These companies
are financially lucrative, with increasing profit margins174 and “[s]ky
[h]igh” valuations.175 A recent report estimates that the global space
industry will generate revenue of $1.1 trillion or more in 2040, up
from $350 billion in 2019.176 Private investment in space companies
hit a record high in 2019, with investment expected to continue its
growth trajectory.177 Some analysts anticipate more private space
companies entering the public markets in the coming years, giving
these companies new sources of capital.178 Moreover, experts signal
that big business has recently taken to investing in the space
173. Article XXV of the Liability Convention governs the amendment process. Liability
Convention, supra note 60, art. XXV.
174. See Brian Wang, SpaceX Operating Margin on Rockets Increasing by over 10% to
74+%, NEXTBIGFUTURE (Dec. 4, 2018), https://www.nextbigfuture.com/2018/12/spacex-
operating-margin-on-rockets-increasing-by-over-10-to-over-80.html [https://perma.cc/LN9L-
SM5R].
175. Trefis Team, What’s Driving SpaceX’s Sky High Valuation?, FORBES (May 30, 2018,
3:35 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/greatspeculations/2018/05/30/whats-driving-spacexs-
sky-high-valuation/#4451b478bde9 [https://perma.cc/FA3E-AP4R].
176. Why Big Business Is Making a Giant Leap into Space, supra note 32.
177. Michael Sheetz, Space Companies Raised a Record $5.8 Billion in Private Investments
Last Year, CNBC (Jan. 14, 2020, 12:53 PM), https://www.cnbc.com/2020/01/14/space-
companies-including-spacex-raised-5point8-billion-in-2019.html [https://perma.cc/MZ7C-
LLX5].
178. Id. (“Investors are steadily becoming more interested in the space economy, especially
as some of these private space companies edge closer to the public markets.”).
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industry.179 Taken together, these factors indicate that the private
space industry is no longer a fledgling industry, but rather a
mammoth industry in the early days of its golden years. As such,
spacefaring companies are able to take financial responsibility for
damage caused by their space objects.
Moreover, an international regime imposing liability directly on
spacefaring companies would create more efficiency and certainty
for these companies, which ultimately benefits their business
operations. Indeed, this amendment would allow the victim party to
bypass the convoluted process of entreating its national government
to file a claim and negotiate it with the national government of the
launching company.180 Rather, the victim party could work directly
with the company whose space object caused the damage, thus
reducing the transaction costs of the claim.181 Furthermore, direct
imposition of liability on companies would avoid the difficulties of
identifying which launching state to hold liable in an event similar
to that illustrated in Part III.A.182 The parties would not be forced
to debate ancillary procedural issues, but instead could immediately
dispute the merits of the claim. Therefore, this amendment would
be good for business: spacefaring companies would spend less time
and fewer resources on legal formalities.
Supporters of the current liability regime, however, note that it
has several benefits. First, by holding the launching state interna-
tionally liable, the regime ensures that the victim will be compen-
sated because states have sufficiently large treasuries to pay the
enormous costs related to space object damage.183 By ensuring that
179. Why Big Business Is Making a Giant Leap into Space, supra note 32 (“While space
retains an undeniably speculative aspect, especially around development of business models,
a number of factors are coming together now to suggest that big business’s foray into space
is here.”).
180. See VAN TRAA-ENGELMAN, supra note 136, at 347 (“[I]t is evident that private parties
are still dependent on the willingness and cooperation of States to initiate action in order to
materialize claims accommodated by the Liability Convention.”).
181. See id.
182. See supra Part III.A.
183. St. John, supra note 5, at 711-12 (“The treaties made states responsible for damage
because states had deep enough coffers to pay the extraordinary costs for a space-related
disaster.”).
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compensation is available, this regime nominally protects victim
parties.184
Second, many argue that the favorable national space legislation
that numerous States have adopted is necessary for continued
private space industry development.185 Indeed, some States with
indemnification procedures cap the potential liability of the
spacefaring companies.186 For example, the United States requires
spacefaring companies to purchase liability insurance before
obtaining a license to launch.187 The Department of Transportation
determines the required coverage amount for each launch, but
federal law caps this amount at $500 million per launch.188 If the
space object causes damage that exceeds the required coverage
amount, the United States will pay the remainder—up to $1.5
billion.189 In effect, the government shares liability risk with the
companies by capping their potential liability to third parties.190
This liability cap protects spacefaring companies from facing
massive liability damages, which, many argue, is crucial for the
development of the private space industry.191
This Note concludes that, while these arguments may have been
effective in the early days of the commercial space industry, they no
longer prove controlling. The private space industry has rapidly
matured in recent years.192 Spacefaring companies are generating
increasing profit margins and are attracting unprecedented levels
of investment.193 As such, spacefaring companies no longer require
184. See id.
185. Matthew Schaefer, The Need for Federal Preemption and International Negotiations
Regarding Liability Caps and Waivers of Liability in the U.S. Commercial Space Industry, 33
BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 223, 273 (2015) (“Recognizing the importance of the growing commercial
space industry to U.S. national security and the national economy, enhanced liability
protections should be afforded to the nascent industry to avoid ‘crushing liability’ on U.S.
space companies.”); see also Dempsey, supra note 20, at 43 (“During the embryonic and
developmental period of commercial space activity, liability [of the companies] should be
capped.”).
186. Albert, supra note 6, at 249.
187. Mitchell, supra note 149, at 446.
188. Id.
189. Id.
190. See id.
191. See, e.g., Dempsey, supra note 20, at 43.
192. See supra Part I.
193. See supra notes 176-80 and accompanying text.
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financial insulation from liability by the government. The time has
come to streamline the liability process and hold these companies
directly liable for any damage that their space objects cause.
C. What Would This New Regime Look Like?
While the mechanisms of this new liability regime are largely
beyond the scope of this Note, the establishment of an international
space tribunal is one potential method by which the international
community can respond to the issues depicted in this Note. Many
scholars have advocated for the creation of a permanent tribunal to
adjudicate claims related to international activity in outer space.194
Such a tribunal could be modeled after other international adjudica-
tory agencies, like the European Court of Human Rights.195 Under
this model, any party—a state, company, individual, or other-
wise—that suffers damage by a space object could file a claim with
the international space tribunal.196 The tribunal would then use
applicable space treaties, international custom, and general
principles of international law to adjudicate the claim and assign
liability for the damage.197 The tribunal would not distinguish
between public or private entities when making this adjudication.198
An international space tribunal could have several benefits. First,
judges on the tribunal would develop expertise in complex, space-
related technicalities, which would ensure that claims are adjudi-
cated fairly and accurately.199 Second, the tribunal would consist of
judges from numerous countries, which would prevent biased treaty
interpretation and protect parties from inequitable rulings.200 Third,
a specialized tribunal would make damage awards more predictable,
194. Ernest, supra note 84, at 539 (suggesting the creation of an international tribunal to
“resolve disputes in accordance with proposed outer space treaty provisions, ‘international
custom,’ and ‘general principles of the law of civilized nations,’” but acknowledging that such
a solution may be unworkable (footnotes omitted)); Taghdiri, supra note 44, at 429 (suggesting
that an international space tribunal that deals “exclusively with space-related accidents”
would mitigate the problems associated with flag states).
195. Taghdiri, supra note 44, at 429.
196. See id.
197. Id.
198. Id.
199. See Ernest, supra note 84, at 539-40.
200. See id.
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allowing launching entities to structure their operations more
efficiently.201 Thus, the international community could benefit from
the creation of an international space tribunal.
An international space tribunal, however, could have unintended
consequences for the international community. For instance, such
a tribunal could increase the transaction costs of filing a claim.202
Because the tribunal would adopt its own processes and procedures,
litigating before it would become more complex than simply
litigating before a domestic court.203 Parties could be reluctant to
pursue a claim in the international forum due to these higher
transaction costs.204 An international space tribunal, therefore, may
have significant drawbacks.
The creation of an international space tribunal would radically
change the process by which international claims for space object
damage are resolved.205 As such, this Note encourages future
scholarship pertaining to the establishment of a permanent
international space tribunal.
CONCLUSION
The space industry is rapidly changing. An industry that was
once controlled by nation-states competing to explore the outer
reaches of space has become increasingly dominated by spacefaring
companies.206 These companies are changing the rules of the game
in countless ways and have worked to make space more accessible
for both public and private entities.207 As a result, space activity has
skyrocketed—and will continue to skyrocket—as companies seek to
capture the benefits of outer space.208 With an increased use of space
objects comes a corresponding increase in the risk of these objects
causing damage.209
201. See Taghdiri, supra note 44, at 429.
202. Ernest, supra note 84, at 540.
203. Id.
204. See id.
205. See id. at 539.
206. Bennett, supra note 1, at 63.
207. See, e.g., About SpaceX, supra note 2.
208. See Lavender, supra note 4.
209. St. John, supra note 5, at 688.
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Yet, the law governing international liability for space object
damage has remained shockingly stagnant since its inception in the
1960s and early 1970s. The Liability Convention has not been
amended or updated since its creation in 1972, and its state-centric
procedures have become increasingly outdated in a modern space
industry dominated by the private sector.210
Consequently, numerous issues arise when the Convention is
applied to spacefaring companies. First, the Convention’s definition
of “launching state” creates problems identifying which state should
be considered the launching state of a space object when multiple
states satisfy the Convention’s requirements.211 If one state could
technically be on both sides of the dispute, how is the issue re-
solved? Second, the Liability Convention fails to establish uniform
liability standards, which has led to the development of national
standards and, ultimately, the problems associated with flag states
in the space industry.212 Third, the terms of the Liability Convention
are largely weak and ineffective when applied to companies.213 The
Convention places too much weight on good-faith negotiations
between the parties, which creates uncertainty as to whether a
dispute can adequately be resolved.214
As such, this Note proposes a two-part solution to bring the
Liability Convention into the modern age. First, the global commu-
nity should amend the Convention in a wide-ranging, international
effort.215 International cohesion is required to properly address the
concerns discussed in this Note, such as the problems associated
with having a patchwork of national laws regulating the space
industry.216 Consequently, the parties to the Convention should
invoke its amendment process set forth in Article XXV.217
Second, the Liability Convention should be amended to assign
liability directly on companies whose space objects have damaged an
210. See Albert, supra note 6, at 244.
211. See supra Part III.A.
212. See supra Part III.B.
213. See supra Part III.C.
214. See supra Part III.C.
215. See supra Part IV.A.
216. See supra Part IV.A.
217. See Liability Convention, supra note 60, art. XXV.
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international party.218 These spacefaring companies no longer
require insulation from liability by their national governments: the
companies have the financial position necessary to take responsibil-
ity for their operations.219 Furthermore, by removing national
governments from the process, this amendment would create a
streamlined and more efficient liability process for companies,
which, ultimately, is good for business.220
While the procedures of this new international liability regime
are beyond the scope of this Note, the prospect of establishing a
permanent international space tribunal is a particularly intriguing
solution, and this Note encourages further scholarship on the
topic.221 Nevertheless, the international community should rewrite
the rules governing liability in space to reflect modern realities. It
is time to amend the Liability Convention to assign liability directly
on companies operating in outer space.
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